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Abstract. Two-player games on graphs provide the theoretical frame-
work for many important problems such as reactive synthesis. While the
traditional study of two-player zero-sum games has been extended to
multi-player games with several notions of equilibria, they are decidable
only for perfect-information games, whereas several applications require
imperfect-information games.
In this paper we propose a new notion of equilibria, called doomsday
equilibria, which is a strategy profile such that all players satisfy their
own objective, and if any coalition of players deviates and violates even
one of the players objective, then the objective of every player is violated.
We present algorithms and complexity results for deciding the existence
of doomsday equilibria for various classes of ω-regular objectives, both
for imperfect-information games, and for perfect-information games. We
provide optimal complexity bounds for imperfect-information games, and
in most cases for perfect-information games.
1 Introduction
Two-player games on finite-state graphs with ω-regular objectives provide the
framework to study many important problems in computer science [29, 27, 14].
One key application area is synthesis of reactive systems [5, 28, 26]. Traditionally,
the reactive synthesis problem is reduced to two-player zero-sum games, where
vertices of the graph represent states of the system, edges represent transitions,
one player represents a component of the system to synthesize, and the other
player represents the purely adversarial coalition of all the other components.
Since the coalition is adversarial, the game is zero-sum, i.e., the objectives of the
two players are complementary. Two-player zero-sum games have been studied
in great depth in literature [21, 14, 16].
Instead of considering all the other components as purely adversarial, a more
realistic model is to consider them as individual players each with their own
objective, as in protocol synthesis where the rational behavior of the agents is
to first satisfy their own objective in the protocol before trying to be adversarial
to the other agents. Hence, inspired by recent applications in protocol synthe-
sis, the model of multi-player games on graphs has become an active area of
research in graph games and reactive synthesis [1, 15, 30]. In a multi-player set-
ting, the games are not necessarily zero-sum (i.e., objectives are not necessarily
conflicting) and the classical notion of rational behavior is formalized as Nash
equilibria [24]. Nash equilibria perfectly capture the notion of rational behavior
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2in the absence of external criteria, i.e., the players are concerned only about
their own payoff (internal criteria), and they are indifferent to the payoff of the
other players. In the setting of synthesis, the more appropriate notion is the
adversarial external criteria, where the players are as harmful as possible to the
other players without sabotaging with their own objectives. This has inspired
the study of refinements of Nash equilibria, such as secure equilibria [10] (that
captures the adversarial external criteria), rational synthesis [15], and led to sev-
eral new logics where the non-zero-sum equilibria can be expressed [11, 12, 23,
31, 22]. The complexity of Nash equilibria [30], secure equilibria [10], rational
synthesis [15], and of the new logics has been studied recently [11, 12, 23, 31].
Along with the theoretical study of refinements of equilibria, applications
have also been developed in the synthesis of protocols. In particular, the notion
of secure equilibria has been useful in the synthesis of mutual-exclusion pro-
tocol [10], and of fair-exchange protocols [19, 6] (a key protocol in the area of
security for exchange of digital signatures). One major drawback that all the
notions of equilibria suffer is that the basic decision questions related to them
are decidable only in the setting of perfect-information games (in a perfect-
information games the players perfectly know the state and history of the game,
whereas in imperfect-information games each player has only a partial view of the
state space of the game), and in the setting of multi-player imperfect-information
games they are undecidable [26]. However, the model of imperfect-information
games is very natural because every component of a system has private variables
not accessible to other components, and recent works have demonstrated that
imperfect-information games are required in synthesis of fair-exchange proto-
cols [18]. In this paper, we provide the first decidable framework that can model
them.
We propose a new notion of equilibria which we call doomsday-threatening
equilibria (for short, doomsday equilibria). A doomsday equilibria is a strategy
profile such that all players satisfy their own objective, and if any coalition of
players deviates and violates even one of the players objective, then doomsday
follows (every player objective is violated). Note that in contrast to other no-
tions of equilibria, doomsday equilibria consider deviation by an arbitrary set
of players, rather than individual players. Moreover, in case of two-player non-
zero-sum games they coincide with the secure equilibria [10] where objectives of
both players are satisfied.
Example 1. Let us consider the two trees of Fig. 1. They model the possible
behaviors of two entities Alice and Bob that have the objective of exchanging
messages: mAB from Alice to Bob, and mBA from Bob to Alice. Assume for the
sake of illustration that mAB models the transfer of property of an house from
Alice to Bob, while mBA models the payment of the price of the house from Bob
to Alice.
Having that interpretation in mind, let us consider the left tree. On the one
hand, Alice has as primary objective (internal criterion) to reach either state
2 or state 4, states in which she has obtained the money, and she has a slight
preference for 2 as in that case she received the money while not transferring
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Fig. 1. A simple example in the domain of Fair Exchange Protocols
the property of her house to Bob, this corresponds to her adversarial external
criterion. On the other hand, Bob would like to reach either state 3 or 4 (with
again a slight preference for 3). Also, it should be clear that Alice would hate to
reach 3 because she would have transferred the property of her house to Bob but
without being paid. Similarly, Bob would hate to reach 2. To summarize, Alice has
the following preference order on the final states of the protocol: 2 > 4 > 1 > 3,
while for Bob the order is 3 > 4 > 1 > 2. Is there a doomsday threatening
equilibrium in this game ? For such an equilibrium to exist, we must find a pair
of strategies that please the two players for their primary objective (internal
criterion): reach {2, 4} for Alice and reach {1, 2} for Bob. Clearly, this is only
possible if at the root Alice plays ”send mAB”, as otherwise we would not reach
{1, 2} violating the primary objective of Bob. But playing that action is not safe
for Alice as Bob would then choose ”not send mAB” because he slightly prefers 3
to 4. It can be shown that the only rational way of playing (taking into account
both internal and external criteria) is for Alice to play ”not send mAB” and for
Bob would to play ”not send mBA”. This way of playing is in fact the only secure
equilibrium of the game but this is not what we hope from such a protocol.
The difficulty in this exchange of messages comes from the fact that Alice
is starting the protocol by sending her part and this exposes her. To obtain a
better behaving protocol, one solution is to add an additional stage after the
exchanges of the two messages as depicted in the right tree of Fig. 1. In this
new protocol, Alice has the possibility to cancel the exchange of messages (in
practice this would be implemented by the intervention of a TTP1). For that
new game, the preference orderings of the players are as follows: for Alice it is
3 > 7 > 1 = 2 = 4 = 6 = 8 > 5, and for Bod it is 5 > 7 > 1 = 2 = 4 = 6 = 8 > 3.
Let us now show that there is a doomsday equilibrium in this new game. In the
first round, Alice should play ”send mAB” as otherwise the internal objective
of Bob would be violated, then Bob should play ”send mBA”, and finally Alice
should play “OK” to validate the exchange of messages. Clearly, this profile of
strategies satisfies the first property of a doomsday equilibrium: both players
have reached their primary objective. Second, let us show that no player has
an incentive to deviate from that profile of strategies. First, if Alice deviates
1 TTP stands for Trusted Third Party
4objectives safety reachability BAˆ¸chi co-BAˆ¸chi parity
PSpace
perfect information PSpace-C PTime-C PTime-C PTime-C NP-Hard
CoNP-Hard
imperfect information ExpTime-C ExpTime-C ExpTime-C ExpTime-C ExpTime-C
Table 1. Summary of the results
then Bob would play ”not send mBA”, and we obtain a doomsday situation as
both players have their primary objectives violated. Second, if Bob deviates by
playing ”not send mBA”, then Alice would cancel the protocol exchange which
again produces a doomsday situation. So, no player has an incentive to deviate
from the equilibrium and the outcome of the protocol is the desired one: the two
messages have been fairly exchanged. So, we see that the threat of a doomsday
that brings the action ”Cancel” has a beneficial influence on the behavior of the
two players. 
It should now be clear that multi-player games with doomsday equilibria
provide a suitable framework to model various problems in protocol synthesis.
In addition to the definition of doomsday equilibria, our main contributions
are to present algorithms and complexity bounds for deciding the existence of
such equilibria for various classes of ω-regular objectives both in the perfect-
information and in the imperfect-information cases. In all cases but one, we
establish the exact complexity. Our technical contributions are summarized in
Table 1. More specifically:
1. (Perfect-information games). We show that deciding the existence of dooms-
day equilibria in multi-player perfect-information games is (i) PTIME-complete
for reachability, Bu¨chi, and coBu¨chi objectives; (ii) PSPACE-complete for
safety objectives; and (iii) in PSPACE and both NP-hard and coNP-hard
for parity objectives.
2. (Imperfect-information games). We show that deciding the existence of dooms-
day equilibria in multi-player imperfect-information games is EXPTIME-
complete for reachability, safety, Bu¨chi, coBu¨chi, and parity objectives.
The area of multi-player games and various notion of equilibria is an active area
of research, but notions that lead to decidability in the imperfect-information
setting and has applications in synthesis has largely been an unexplored area.
Our work is a step towards it.
2 Doomsday Equilibria for Perfect Information Games
In this section, we define game arena with perfect information, ω-regular objec-
tives, and doomsday equilibria.
Game Arena An n-player game arena G with perfect information is defined
as a tuple (S,P, sinit, Σ,∆) such that S is a nonempty finite set of states, P =
5{S1, S2, . . . , Sn} is a partition of S into n classes of states, one for each player
respectively, sinit ∈ S is the initial state, Σ is a finite set of actions, and ∆ :
S ×Σ → S is the transition function.
Plays in n-player game arena G are constructed as follows. They start in
the initial state sinit, and then an ω number of rounds are played as follows: the
player that owns the current state s chooses a letter σ ∈ Σ and the game evolves
to the position s′ = ∆(s, σ), then a new round starts from s′. So formally, a
play in G is an infinite sequence s0s1 . . . sn . . . such that (i) s0 = sinit and (i) for
all i ≥ 0, there exists σ ∈ Σ such that si+1 = ∆(si, σ). The set of plays in G
is denoted by Plays(G), and the set of finite prefixes of plays by PrefPlays(G).
We denote by ρ, ρ1, ρi, . . . plays in G, by ρ(0..j) the prefix of the play ρ up to
position j and by ρ(j) the position j in the play ρ. We also use pi, pi1, pi2, ... to
denote prefixes of plays. Let i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, a prefix pi belongs to Player i if
last(pi), the last state of pi, belongs to Player i, i.e. last(pi) ∈ Si. We denote by
PrefPlaysi(G) the set of prefixes of plays in G that belongs to Player i.
Strategies and strategy profiles A strategy for Player i, for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
is a mapping λi : PrefPlaysi(G)→ Σ from prefixes of plays to actions. A strategy
profile Λ = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λn) is a tuple of strategies such that λi is a strategy of
Player i. The strategy of Player i in Λ is denoted by Λi, and the the tuple of
the remaining strategies (λ1, . . . , λi−1, λi+1, . . . , λn) by Λ−i. For a strategy λi
of Player i, we define its outcome as the set of plays that are consistent with
λi: formally, outcomei(λi) is the set of ρ ∈ Plays(G) such that for all j ≥ 0,
if ρ(0..j) ∈ PrefPlaysi(G), then ρ(j + 1) = ∆(ρ(j), λi(ρ(0..j))). Similarly, we
define the outcome of a strategy profile Λ = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λn), as the unique play
ρ ∈ Plays(G) such that for all positions j, for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, if ρ(j) ∈
PrefPlaysi(G) then ρ(j + 1) = ∆(ρ(j), λi(ρ(0..j))). Finally, given a state s ∈ S
of the game, we denote by Gs the game G whose initial state is replaced by s.
Winning objectives A winning objective (or an objective for short) ϕi for
Player i∈{1, 2, . . . , n} is a set of infinite sequences of states, i.e. ϕi⊆Sω. A strat-
egy λi is winning for Player i (against all other players) w.r.t. an objective ϕi if
outcomei(λi) ⊆ ϕi.
Given an infinite sequence of states ρ ∈ Sω, we denote by visit(ρ) the set of
states that appear at least once along ρ, i.e. visit(ρ) = {s ∈ S|∃i ≥ 0 · ρ(i) = s},
and inf(ρ) the set of states that appear infinitely often along ρ, i.e. inf(ρ) =
{s ∈ S|∀i ≥ 0 · ∃j ≥ i · ρ(i) = s}. We consider the following types of winning
objectives:
– a safety objective is defined by a subset of states T ⊆ S that has to be never
left: safe(T ) = {ρ ∈ Sω | visit(ρ) ⊆ T};
– a reachability objective is defined by a subset of states T ⊆ S that has to be
reached: reach(T ) = {ρ ∈ Sω | visit(ρ) ∩ T 6= ∅};
– a Bu¨chi objective is defined by a subset of states T ⊆ S that has to be visited
infinitely often: Bu¨chi(T ) = {ρ ∈ Sω | inf(ρ) ∩ T 6= ∅};
– a co-Bu¨chi objective is defined by a subset of states T ⊆ S that has to be
reached eventually and never be left: coBu¨chi(T ) = {ρ ∈ Sω | inf(ρ) ⊆ T};
6– let d ∈ N, a parity objective with d priorities is defined by a priority function
p : S → {0, 1, . . . , d} as the set of plays such that the smallest priority visited
infinitely often is even: parity(p) = {ρ ∈ Sω|min{p(s) | s ∈ inf(ρ)} is even}.
Bu¨chi, co-Bu¨chi and parity objectives ϕ are called tail objectives because they
enjoy the following closure property: for all ρ ∈ ϕ and all pi ∈ S∗, ρ ∈ ϕ iff
pi · ρ ∈ ϕ.
Finally, given an objective ϕ ⊆ Sω and a subset P ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, we write
〈〈P 〉〉ϕ to denote the set of states s from which the players from P can cooperate
to enforce ϕ when they start playing in s. Formally, 〈〈P 〉〉ϕ is the set of states s
such that there exists a set of strategies {λi | i ∈ P} in Gs, one for each player
in P , such that
⋂
i∈P outcomei(λi) ⊆ ϕ.
Doomsday Equilibria A strategy profile Λ = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λn) is a doomsday-
threatening equilibrium (doomsday equilibrium or DE for short) if:
1. it is winning for all the players, i.e. outcome(Λ) ∈ ⋂i ϕi;
2. each player is able to retaliate in case of deviation: for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, for all
ρ ∈ outcomei(λi), if ρ 6∈ ϕi, then ρ ∈
⋂j=n
j=1 ϕj (doomsday), where ϕj denotes
the complement of ϕj in S
ω.
In other words, when all players stick to their strategies then they all win,
and if any arbitrary coalition of players deviates and makes even just one other
player lose then this player retaliates and ensures a doomsday, i.e. all players
lose.
Relation with Secure Equilibria In two-player games, the doomsday equilibria
coincide with the notion of secure equilibrium [10] where both players satisfy
their objectives. In secure equilibria, for all i ∈ {1, 2}, any deviation of Player
i that does not decrease her payoff does not decrease the payoff of Player 3−i
either. In other words, if a deviation of Player i decreases (strictly) the payoff of
Player 3−i, i.e. ϕ3−i is not satisfied, then it also decreases her own payoff, i.e. ϕi
is not satisfied. A two-player secure equilibrium where both players satisfy their
objectives is therefore a doomsday equilibrium.
Example 2. Fig. 2 gives two examples of games with safety and Bu¨chi objectives
respectively. Actions are in bijection with edges so they are not represented.
(Safety) Consider the 3-player game arena with perfect information of Fig.
2(a) and safety objectives. Unsafe states for each player are given by the respec-
tive nodes of the upper part. Assume that the initial state is one of the safe
states. This example models a situation where three countries are in peace until
one of the countries, say country i, decides to attack country j. This attack will
then necessarily be followed by a doomsday situation: country j has a strategy
to punish all other countries. The doomsday equilibrium in this example is to
play safe for all players.
(Bu¨chi) Consider the 3-player game arena with perfect information of Fig.
2(b) with Bu¨chi objectives for each player: Player i wants to visit infinitely often
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Fig. 2. Examples of doomsday equilibria for Safety and Bu¨chi objectives
one of its “happy” states. The position of the initial state does not matter. To
make things more concrete, let us use this game to model a protocol where 3
players want to share in each round a piece of information made of three parts:
for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, Player i knows information i mod 3+1 and i mod 3+2. Player
i can send or not these informations to the other players. This is modeled by the
fact that Player i can decide to visit the happy states of the other players, or
move directly to s(i mod 3)+1. The objective of each player is to have an infinite
number of successful rounds where they get all information.
There are several doomsday equilibria. As a first one, let us consider the
situation where for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, if Player i is in state si, first it visits the
happy states, and when the play comes back in si, it moves to s(i mod 3)+1. This
defines an infinite play that visits all the states infinitely often. Whenever some
player deviates from this play, the other players retaliate by always choosing
in the future to go to the next s state instead of taking their respective loops.
Clearly, if all players follow their respective strategies all happy states are visited
infinitely often. Now consider the strategy of Player i against two strategies of
the other players that makes him lose. Clearly, the only way Player i loses is
when the two other players eventually never take their states, but then all the
players lose.
As a second one, consider the strategies where Player 2 and Player 3 always
take their loops but Player 1 never takes his loop, and such that whenever the
play deviates, Player 2 and 3 retialate by never taking their loops. For the same
reasons as before this strategy profile is a doomsday equilibrium.
Note that the first equilibrium requires one bit of memory for each player, to
remember if they visit their s state for the first or second times. In the second
equilibrium, only Player 2 and 3 needs a bit of memory. An exhaustive analysis
shows that there is no memoryless doosmday equilibrium in this example. 
83 Complexity of DE for Perfect Information Games
In this section, we prove the following results:
Theorem 1. The problem of deciding the existence of a doomsday equilibrium
in an n-player perfect information game arena and n objectives (ϕi)1≤i≤n is:
– PTime-C if the objectives (ϕi)1≤i≤n are either all Bu¨chi, all co-Bu¨chi or all
reachability objectives,
– NP-hard, coNP-hard and in PSPace if (ϕi)1≤i≤n are parity objectives,
– PSPace-C if (ϕi)1≤i≤n are safety objectives.
In the sequel, game arena with perfect information are just called game arena.
Tail objectives We first present a generic algorithm that works for any tail ob-
jective and then analyze its complexity for the different cases. Then we establish
the lower bounds. Let us consider the following algorithm:
– compute the retaliation region of each player: Ri = 〈〈i〉〉(ϕi ∪
⋂j=n
j=1 ϕj);
– check for the existence of a play within
⋂i=n
i=1 Ri that satisfies all the objec-
tives ϕi.
The correctness of this generic procedure is formalized in the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Let G = (S,P, sinit, Σ,∆) be an n-player game arena with n tail
objectives (ϕi)1≤i≤n. Let Ri = 〈〈i〉〉(ϕi ∪
⋂j=n
j=1 ϕj) be the retaliation region for
Player i. There is a doomsday equilibrium in G iff there exists an infinite play
that (1) belongs to
⋂i=n
i=1 ϕi and (2) stays within the set of states
⋂i=n
i=1 Ri and
Proof. First, assume that there exists an infinite play ρ such that ρ ∈ ⋂i(ϕi ∩
Rωi ). From ρ, and the retaliating strategies that exist in all states of Ri for each
player, we show the existence of DE Λ = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λn). Player i plays strategy
λi as follows: he plays according to the choices made in ρ as long as all the
other players do so, and as soon as the play deviates from ρ, Player i plays his
retaliating strategy (when it is his turn to play).
First, let us show that if Player j, for some j 6= i, deviates and the turn
comes back to Player i in a state s then s ∈ Ri. Assume that Player j deviates
when he is in some s′ ∈ Sj . As before there was no deviation, by definition of
ρ, s′ belongs to Ri. But no matter what the adversary are doing in a state that
belongs to Ri, the next state must be a state that belongs to Ri (there is only
the possibility to leave Ri when Player i plays). So, by induction on the length
of the segment of play that separates s′ and s, we can conclude that s belongs
to Ri. From s, Player i plays a retaliating strategy and so all the outcomes from
s are in ϕi ∪
⋂j=n
j=1 ϕj , and since the objective are tails, the prefix up to s is not
important and we get (from sinit) outcomei(λi) ⊆ ϕi ∪
⋂j=n
j=1 ϕj . Therefore the
second property of the definition of doomsday equilibria is satisfied. Hence Λ is
a DE.
9Let us now consider the other direction. Assume that Λ is a DE. Then let
us show that ρ = outcome(Λ) satisfies properties (1) and (2). By definition of
DE, we know that ρ is winning for all the players, so (1) is satisfied. Again by
definition of DE, outcome(Λi) ⊆ ϕi ∪
⋂j=n
j=1 ϕj . Let s be a state of ρ and pi the
prefix of ρ up to s. For all outcomes ρ′ of Λi in Gs, we have piρ′ ∈ ϕi ∪
⋂j=n
j=1 ϕj ,
and since the objectives are tail, we get ρ′ ∈ ϕi ∪
⋂j=n
j=1 ϕj . Hence s ∈ Ri. Since
this property holds for all i, we get s ∈ ⋂iRi, and (2) is satisfied. uunionsq
Accordingly, we obtain the following upper-bounds:
Lemma 2. The problem of deciding the existence of a doomsday equilibrium
in an n-player game arena can be decided in PTime for Bu¨chi and co-Bu¨chi
objectives, and in PSpace for parity objectives.
Proof. By Lemma 1 one first needs to compute the retaliation regions Ri for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Once the sets Ri have been computed, it is clear that the existence
of a play winning for all players is decidable in PTime for all the three types of
objectives. For the Bu¨chi and the co-Bu¨chi cases, let us show how to compute
the retaliation regions Ri. We start with Bu¨chi and we assume that each player
wants to visit a set of states Ti infinitely often. Computing the sets Ri boils
down to computing the set of states s from which Player i has a strategy to
enforce the objective (in LTL syntax) ♦Ti ∨
∧j=n
j=1 ♦Tj , which is equivalent
to the formula ♦Ti ∨ ♦
⋂j=n
j=1 Tj . This is equivalent to a disjunction of a
Bu¨chi and a co-Bu¨chi objective, which is thus equivalent to a Streett objective
with one Streett pair and can be solved in PTime with a classical algorithm,
e.g. [25]. Similarly, for co-Bu¨chi objectives, one can reduce the computation of
the regions Ri in polynomial time to the disjunction of a Bu¨chi objective and a
co-Bu¨chi objective.
For the parity case, the winning objectives for the retaliation sets can be
encoded compactly as Muller objectives defined by a propositional formula us-
ing one proposition per state. Then they can be solved in PSpace using the
algorithm of Emerson and Lei presented in [13]. uunionsq
Let us now establish the lower bounds.
Lemma 3. The problem of deciding the existence of a DE in an n-player game
arena is PTime-Hard for Bu¨chi and co-Bu¨chi objectives, NP-Hard and coNP-
Hard for parity objectives. All the hardness results hold even for a fixed number
of players.
Proof. The hardness for Bu¨chi and co-Bu¨chi objectives holds already for 2 play-
ers. We describe the reduction for Bu¨chi and it is similar for co-Bu¨chi. We reduce
the problem of deciding the winner in a two-player zero-sum game arena G with
a Bu¨chi objective (known as a PTime-Hard problem [17]) to the existence of a
DE for Bu¨chi objectives with two players. Consider a copy G′ of the game arena
G and the following two objectives: Player 1 has the same Bu¨chi objective as
Player 1 in G, and Player 2 has a trivial Bu¨chi objective (i.e. all states are Bu¨chi
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states). Then clearly there exists a DE in G′ iff Player 1 has a winning strategy
in G. Details are given in appendix.
For parity games, we can reduce zero-sum two-player games with a conjunc-
tion of parity objectives (known to be coNP-Hard [9]) to the existence of a
DE in a three player game with parity objectives. Similarly, we can reduce the
problem of deciding the winner in a two-player zero-sum game with a disjunction
of parity objectives (known to be NP-Hard [9]) to the existence of a DE in a
two-player game with parity objectives. The main idea in the two cases is to
construct a game arena where one of the players can retaliate iff Player 1 in the
original two-player zero-sum game has a winning strategy. Details are given in
appendix. uunionsq
As a corollary of this result, deciding the existence of a secure equilibrium in a
2-player game such that both players satisfy their parity objectives is NP-Hard.
Reachability objectives We now establish the complexity of deciding the exis-
tence of a doomsday equilibria in an n-player game with reachability objectives.
We first establish an important property for reachability objectives:
Proposition 1. Let G = (S,P, sinit, Σ,∆) be a game arena, and (Ti)1≤i≤n be n
subsets of S. Let Λ be a doomsday equilibrium in G for the reachability objectives
(Reach(Ti))1≤i≤n. Let s the first state in outcome(Λ) such that s ∈
⋃
i Ti. Then
every player has a strategy from s, against all the other players, to reach his
target set.
Proof. W.l.o.g. we can assume that s ∈ T1. If some player, say Player 2, as
no strategy from s to reach his target set T2, then necessarily s 6∈ T2 and by
determinancy the other players have a strategy from s to make Player 2 lose.
This contradicts the fact that Λ is a doomsday equilibrium as it means that Λ2
is not a retaliating strategy. uunionsq
Lemma 4. The problem of deciding the existence of a doomsday equilibrium in
an n-player game with reachability objectives is in PTime.
Proof. The algorithm consists in:
(1) computing the sets Ri from which player i can retaliate, i.e. the set of
states s from which Player i has a strategy to force, against all other players, an
outcome such that ♦Ti∨(
∧j=n
j=1 Tj). This set can be obtained by first computing
the set of states 〈〈i〉〉♦Ti from which Player i can force to reach Ti. It is done
in PTime by solving a classical two-player reachability game. Then the set of
states where Player i has a strategy λi such that outcomei(λi) |= ((
⋂j=n
j=1 Tj)∨
〈〈i〉〉♦Ti)}, that is to confine the plays in states that do not satisfy the reachability
objectives of the adversaries or from where Player i can force its own reachability
objective. Again this can be done in PTime by solving a classical two-player
safety game.
(2) then, checking the existence of some i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and some finite path pi
starting from sinit and that stays within
⋂j=n
j=1 Rj before reaching a state s such
that s ∈ Ti and s ∈
⋂j=n
j=1 〈〈j〉〉♦Tj .
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Let us now prove the correctness of our algorithm. From its output, we can
construct the strategy profile Λ where each Λj (j = 1, . . . , n) is as follows:
follow pi up to the point where either another player deviates and then play the
retaliating strategy available in Ri, or to the point where s is visited for the first
time and then play according to a strategy (from s) that force a visit to Ti no
matter how the other players are playing. Clearly, Λ witnesses a DE. Indeed, if
s is reached, then all players have a strategy to reach their target set (including
Player i since s ∈ Ti) . By playing so they will all eventually reach it. Before
reaching s, if some of them deviate, the other have a strategy to retaliate as pi
stays in
⋂j=n
j=1 Rj . The other direction follows from Proposition 1. uunionsq
Lemma 5. The problem of deciding the existence of a DE in a 2-player game
with reachability objectives is PTime-Hard.
Proof. It is proved by an easy reduction from the And-Or graph reachability
problem [17]: if reachability is trivial for one of the two players, the existence of
a doomsday equilibrium is equivalent to the existence of a winning strategy for
the other player in a two-player zero sum reachability game. uunionsq
Safety Objectives We establish the complexity of deciding the existence of a
doomsday equilibrium in an n-player game with perfect information and safety
objectives.
Lemma 6 (PSpace-Easyness). The existence of a doomsday equilibrium in
an n-player game with safety objectives can be decided in PSpace.
Proof. Let us consider an n-player game arena G = (S,P, sinit, Σ,∆) and n
safety objectives safe(T1), . . . , safe(Tn) for T1 ⊆ S, . . . , Tn ⊆ S. The algorithm is
composed of the following two steps:
(1) For each Player i, compute the set of states s ∈ S in the game such that
Player i can retaliate whenever necessary, i.e. the set of states s from where
there exists a strategy λi for Player i such that outcomei(λi) satisfies ¬(Ti)→∧j=n
j=1 ¬Tj , or equivalently ¬(♦Ti) ∨
∧j=n
j=1 ♦Tj . This can be done in PSpace
using a result by Alur et al. (Theorem 5.4 of [2]) on solving two-player games
whose Player 1’s objective is defined by Boolean combinations of LTL formulas
that use only ♦ and ∧. We denote by Ri the set of states in G where Player i
has a strategy to retaliate.
(2) then, verify whether there exists an infinite path in
⋂i=n
i=1 (safe(Ti) ∩Ri).
Now, let us establish the correctness of this algorithm. Assume that an infinite
path exists in
⋂i=n
i=1 (safe(Ti)∩Ri). The strategies λi for each Player i are defined
as follows: play the moves that are prescribed as long as every other players do
so, and as soon as the play deviates from the infinite path, play the retaliating
strategy.
It is easy to see that the profile of strategies Λ = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λn) is a DE.
Indeed, the states are all safe for all players as long as they play their strategies.
Moreover, as before deviation the play is within
⋂i=n
i=1 Ri, if Player j deviates,
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we know that the state that is reached after deviation is still in
⋂j=n
j=1 Rj and
therefore the other players can retaliate.
Second, assume that Λ = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λn) is a DE in the n-player game G
for the safety objectives (safe(Ti))1≤i≤n. Let ρ = outcome(λ1, λ2, . . . , λn). By
definition of doomsday equilibrium, we know that all states appearing in ρ satisfy
all the safety objectives, i.e. ρ |= ∧i=ni=1 Ti. Let us show that the play also
remains within
⋂i=n
i=1 Ri. Let s be a state of ρ, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and pi the finite
prefix of ρ up to s. By definition of DE we have outcome(λi) |= Ti ∨
∧j=n
j=1 ♦Tj .
Therefore for all outcomes ρ′ of λi in Gs, piρ′ |= Ti ∨
∧j=n
j=1 ♦Tj . Moreover,
pi |= ∧j=nj=1 Tj since it is a prefix of ρ. Therefore ρ′ |= Ti ∨ ∧j=nj=1 ♦Tj and
s ∈ Ri. Since it holds for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we get s ∈
⋂i=n
i=1 Ri. uunionsq
Lemma 7 (PSpace-Hardness). The problem of deciding the existence of a
doomsday equilibrium in an n-player game with safety objectives is PSpace-
Hard.
Proof. We present a reduction from the problem of deciding the winner in a
zero-sum two-player game with a conjunction of k reachability objectives (aka
generalized reachability games), which is a PSpace-C problem [3]. The idea of
the reduction is to construct a non-zero sum (k+1)-player game where one of the
players has a retaliating strategy iff there is a winning strategy in the generalized
reachability game. uunionsq
4 Complexity of DE for Imperfect Information Games
In this section, we define n-player game arenas with imperfect information.
We adapt to this context the notions of observation, observation of a play,
observation-based strategies, and we study the notion of doomsday equilibria
when players are restricted to play observation-based strategies.
Game arena with imperfect information An n-player game arena with
imperfect information is a tuple G = (S,P, sinit, Σ,∆, (Oi)1≤i≤n) such that
(S,P, sinit, Σ,∆) is a game arena (of perfect information) and for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
Oi ⊆ 2S is a partition of S. Each block in Oi is called an observation of Player i.
We assume that the players play in a predefined order2: for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
all q ∈ Si and all σ ∈ Σ, ∆(q, σ) ∈ S(i mod n)+1.
Observations For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we denote by Oi(s) ⊆ S the block in Oi
that contains s, that is the observation that Player i has when he is in state s.
We say that two states s, s′ are undistinguishable for Player i if Oi(s) = Oi(s′).
This defines an equivalence relation on states that we denote by ∼i. The notions
of plays and prefixes of plays are slight variations from the perfect information
2 This restriction is not necessary to obtain the results presented in this section (e.g.
Theorem 2) but it makes some of our notations lighter.
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Fig. 3. Game arena with imperfect information and Bu¨chi objectives. Only undistin-
guishable states of Player 1 (circle) are depicted. Observations are symmetric for the
other players.
setting: a play in G is a sequence ρ = s0, σ0, s1, σ1, · · · ∈ (S ·Σ)ω such that s0 =
sinit, and for all j ≥ 0, we have sj+1 = ∆(sj , σj). A prefix of play is a sequence
pi = s0, σ0, s1, σ1, . . . , sk ∈ (S ·Σ)∗ ·S that can be extended into a play. As in the
perfect information setting, we use the notations Plays(G) and PrefPlays(G) to
denote the set of plays in G and its set of prefixes, and PrefPlaysi(G) for the set of
prefixes that end in a state that belongs to Player i. While actions are introduced
explicitly in our notion of play and prefix of play, their visibility is limited by
the notion of observation. The observation of a play ρ = s0, σ0, s1, σ1, . . . by
Player i is the infinite sequence written Obsi(ρ) ∈ (Oi × (Σ ∪ {τ})ω such that
for all j ≥ 0, Obsi(ρ)(j) = (Oi(sj), τ) if sj 6∈ Si, and Obsi(ρ)(j) = (Oi(sj), σj) if
sj ∈ Si. Thus, only actions played by Player i are visible along the play, and the
actions played by the other players are replaced by τ . The observation Obsi(pi)
of a prefix pi is defined similarly. Given an infinite sequence of observations
η ∈ (Oi× (Σ ∪{τ}))ω for Player i, we denote by γi(η) the set of plays in G that
are compatible with η, i.e. γi(η) = {ρ ∈ Plays(G) | Obsi(ρ) = η}. The functions
γi are extended to prefixes of sequences of observations naturally.
Observation-based strategies and doomsday equilibria A strategy λi of
Player i is observation-based if for all prefixes of plays pi1, pi2 ∈ PrefPlaysi(G)
such that Obsi(pi1) = Obsi(pi2), it holds that λi(pi1) = λi(pi2), i.e. while play-
ing with an observation-based strategy, Player i plays the same action after
undistinguishable prefixes. A strategy profile Λ is observation-based if each Λi is
observation-based. Winning objectives, strategy outcomes and winning strate-
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gies are defined as in the perfect information setting. We also define the notion
of outcome relative to a prefix of a play. Given an observation-based strategy λi
for Player i, and a prefix pi = s0, σ0, . . . , sk ∈ PrefPlaysi(G), the strategy λpii is
defined for all prefixes pi′ ∈ PrefPlaysi(Gsk) where Gsk is the game arena G with
initial state sk, by λ
pi
i (pi
′) = λi(pi · pi′). The set of outcomes of the strategy λi
relative to pi is defined by outcomei(pi, λi) = pi · outcomei(λpii ).
The notion of doomsday equilibrium is defined as for games with perfect
information but with the additional requirements that only observation-based
strategies can be used by the players. Given an n-player game arena with imper-
fect information G and n winning objectives (ϕi)1≤i≤n (defined as in the perfect
information setting), we want to solve the problem of deciding the existence of
an observation-based strategy profile Λ which is a doomsday equilibrium in G for
(ϕi)1≤i≤n.
Example 3. Fig. 3 depicts a variant of the example in the perfect information
setting, with imperfect information. In this example let us describe the situation
for Player 1. It is symmetric for the other players. Assume that when Player 2
or Player 3 send their information to Player 1 (modeled by a visit to his happy
states), Player 1 cannot distinguish which of Player 2 or 3 has sent the infor-
mation, e.g. because of the usage of a cryptographic primitive. Nevertheless, let
us show that there exists doomsday equilibrium. Assume that the three players
agree on the following protocol: Player 1 and 2 send their information but not
Player 3.
Let us show that this sequence witnesses a doomsday equilibrium and argue
that this is the case for Player 1. From the point of view of Player 1, if all
players follow this profile of strategies then the outcome is winning for Player 1.
Now, let us consider two types of deviation. First, assume that Player 2 does not
send his information (i.e. does not visit the happy states). In that case Player 1
will observe the deviation and can retaliate by not sending his own information.
Therefore all the players are losing. Second, assume that Player 2 does not send
his information but Player 3 does. In this case it is easy to verify that Player
1 cannot observe the deviation and so according to his strategy will continue
to send his information. This is not problematic because all the plays that are
compatible with Player 1’s observations are such that: (i) they are winning for
Player 1 (note that it would be also acceptable that all the sequence are either
winning for Player 1 or losing for all the other players), and (ii) Player 1 is always
in position to retaliate along this sequence of observations. In our solution below
these two properties are central and will be called doomsday compatible and good
for retaliation. 
Generic Algorithm We present a generic algorithm to test the existence of
an observation-based doomsday equilibrium in a game of imperfect informa-
tion. To present this solution, we need two additional notions: sequences of
observations which are doomsday compatible and prefixes which are good for
retaliation. These two notions are defined as follows. In a game arena G =
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(S,P, sinit, Σ,∆, (Oi)1≤i≤n) with imperfect information and winning objectives
(ϕi)1≤i≤n,
– a sequence of observations η ∈ (Oi × (Σ ∪ {τ}))ω is doomsday compatible
(for Player i) if γi(η) ⊆ ϕi ∪
⋂j=n
j=1 ϕj , i.e. all plays that are compatible with
η are either winning for Player i, or not winning for any other player,
– a prefix κ ∈ (Oi × (Σ ∪ {τ}))∗ · Oi of a sequence of observations is good
for retaliation (for Player i) if there exists an observation-based strategy λRi
such that for all prefixes pi ∈ γi(κ) compatible with κ, outcome(pi, λRi ) ⊆
ϕi ∪
⋂j=n
j=1 ϕj .
The next lemma shows that the notions of sequences of observations that
are doomsday compatible and good for retaliation prefixes are important for
studying the existence of doomsday equilibria for imperfect information games.
Lemma 8. Let G be an n-player game arena with imperfect information and
winning objectives ϕi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. There exists a doomsday equilibrium in G if
and only if there exists a play ρ in G such that:
(F1) ρ ∈
⋂i=n
i=1 ϕi, i.e. ρ is winning for all the players,
(F2) for all Player i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, for all prefixes κ of Obsi(ρ), κ is good for
retaliation for Player i,
(F3) for all Player i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Obsi(ρ) is doomsday compatible for Player i.
Proof. First, assume that conditions (F1), (F2) and (F3) hold and show that
there exists a DE in G. We construct a DE (λ1, . . . , λn) as follows. For each
player i, the strategy λi plays according to the (observation of the) path ρ in G,
as long as the previous observations follow ρ. If an observation is unexpected for
Player i (i.e., differs from the sequence in ρ), then λi switches to an observation-
based retaliating strategy λRi (we will show that such a strategy exists as a
consequence of (F2)). This is a well-defined profile and a DE because: (1) all
strategies are observation-based, and the outcome of the profile is the path ρ that
satisfies all objectives; (2) if no deviation from the observation of ρ is detected
by Player i, then by condition (F3) we know that if the outcome does not satisfy
ϕi, then it does not satisfies ϕj , for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n, (3) if a deviation from the
observation of ρ is detected by Player i, then the sequence of observations of
Player i so far can be decomposed as κ = κ1(o1, σ1) . . . (om, σnm where (o1, σ1)
is the first deviation of the observation of ρ, and (om, σm) is the first time it is
Player i’s turn to play after this deviation (so possibly m = 1). By condition
(F2), we know that κ1 is good for retaliation. Clearly, κ1(o1, σ1) . . . (o`, σ`) is
retaliation compatible as well for all ` ∈ {1, . . . ,m} since retaliation goodness is
preserved by player j’s actions for all j. Therefore κ is good for retaliation and
by definition of retaliation goodness there exists an observation-based retaliation
strategy λRi for Player i which ensures that that regardless of the strategies
of the opponents in coalition, if the outcome does not satisfy ϕi, then for all
j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, it does not satisfy ϕj either.
Second, assume that there exists a DE (λ1, . . . , λn) in G, and show that
(F1), (F2) and (F3) hold. Let ρ be the outcome of the profile (λ1, . . . , λn). Then
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ρ satisfies (F1) by definition of DE. Let us show that it also satisfies (F3). By
contradiction, if obsi(ρ) is not doomsday compatible for Player i, then by defini-
tion, there is a path ρ′ in Plays(G) that is compatible with the observations and
actions of player i in ρ (i.e., obsi(ρ) = obsi(ρ
′)), but ρ′ does not satisfy ϕi, while
it satisfies ϕj for some j 6= i. Then, given the strategy λi from the profile, the
other players in coalition can choose actions to construct the path ρ′ (since ρ and
ρ′ are observationally equivalent for player i, the observation-based strategy λi
is going to play the same actions as in ρ). This would show that the profile is
not a DE, establishing a contradiction. Hence obsi(ρ) is doomsday compatible
for Player i for all i = 1, . . . , n and (F3) holds. Let us show that ρ also satisfies
(F2). Assume that this not true. Assume that κ is a prefix of obsi(ρ) such that κ
is not good for retaliation for Player i for some i. By definition it means that the
other players can make a coalition and enforce an outcome ρ′, from any prefix
of play compatible with κ, that is winning for one of players of the coalition, say
Player j, j 6= i, and losing for Player i. This contradicts the fact that λi belongs
to a DE. uunionsq
Theorem 2. The problem of deciding the existence of a doomsday equilibrium in
an n-player game arena with imperfect information and n objectives is ExpTime-
C for objectives that are either all reachability, all safety, all Bu¨chi, all co-Bu¨chi
or all parity objectives.
Proof. By Lemma 8, we know that we can decide the existence of a doomsday
equilibrium by checking the existence of a play ρ inG that respects the conditions
(F1), (F2), and (F3). It can be shown (see Appendix), for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
that the set of good for retaliation prefixes for Player i is definable by a finite-
state automaton Ci, and the set of observation sequences that are doomsday
compatible for Player i is definable by a Streett automaton Di.
From the automata (Di)1≤i≤n and (Ci)1≤i≤n, we construct using a synchro-
nized product a finite transition system T and check for the existence of a path in
T that satisfy the winning objectives for each player in G, the Streett acceptance
conditions of the (Di)1≤i≤n, and whose all prefixes are accepted by the automata
(Ci)1≤i≤n. The size of T is exponential in G and the acceptance condition is a
conjunction of Streett and safety objectives. The existence of such a path can
be established in polynomial time in the size of T , so in exponential time in the
size of G. The ExpTime-hardness is a consequence of the ExpTime-hardness of
two-player games of imperfect information for all the considered objectives [4,
8]. uunionsq
5 Conclusion
We defined the notion of doomsday threatening equilibria both for perfect and
imperfect information n player games with omega-regular objectives. This notion
generalizes to n player games the winning secure equilibria [10]. Applications in
the analysis of security protocols are envisioned and will be pursued as future
works.
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We have settled the exact complexity in games of perfect information for
almost all omega-regular objectives with complexities ranging from PTime to
PSpace, the only small gap that remains is for parity objectives where we have a
PSpace algorithm and both NP and coNP-hardness. Surprisingly, the existence
of doomsday threatening equilibria in n player games with imperfect information
is decidable and more precisely ExpTime-C for all the objectives that we have
considered.
In a long version of this paper [7], we provide a solution in 2ExpTime for
deciding the existence of a doomsday threatening equilibrium in a game whose
objectives are given as LTL formula (this solution is optimal as it is easy to
show that the classical LTL realizability problem can be reduced to the DE
existence problem). We also provide a Safraless solution [20] suitable to efficient
implementation.
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A Complexity of Doomsday Equilibria for Perfect
Information Games
A.1 Proof of Lemma 3
The proof of Lemma 3 is decomposed into several lemmas.
Lemma 9. The problem of deciding the existence of a doomsday equilibrium
in a 2-player game arena is PTime-hard both for Bu¨chi and co-Bu¨chi winning
objectives.
Proof. We explain the result for Bu¨chi objectives (the proof for co-Bu¨chi objec-
tives is similar). To establish this result, we show how to reduce the problem of
deciding the winner in a two-player zero-sum game with a Bu¨chi objective (for
Player 1), a PTime-C problem [36], can be reduced to the existence of a dooms-
day equilibrium in a two-player game arena with Bu¨chi objectives. Let G be the
two-player game, S its set of states, and T the set of states that Player 1 wants
to visit infinitely often. We reduce the problem of deciding the existence of such
a strategy to the existence of a doomsday equilibrium in the same game arena,
where the objective of Player 1 is the original Bu¨chi objective, i.e. Bu¨chi(T ),
and the objective of Player 2 is trivial: Bu¨chi(S). Clearly, as Player 2 will always
satisfy his objective, Player 1 must have a winning strategy for Bu¨chi(T ) if a
doomsday equilibrium exists (and vice versa) otherwise condition 2 would be
violated. uunionsq
We now turn to the proof of lower bounds for parity objectives. We build our
proof for these lower bounds on the hardness of generalized parity games [34]:
in a two-player (called Player A and Player B) zero-sum game, and an objective
given by:
– the disjunction of two parity objectives, it is NP-Hard to decide if Player A
has a winning strategy,
– the conjunction of two parity objectives, it is coNP-Hard to decide if
Player A has a winning strategy.
We next show that these decision problems can be reduced to the problem of the
existence of a doomsday equilibrium in an n player game with parity objectives.
Lemma 10 (coNP-Hardness). The problem of deciding the existence of a
doomsday equilibrium in a 3-player game arena with parity objectives is coNP-
hard.
Proof. Let G = (S, {SA, SB}, sinit, Σ,∆) be a two-player game and a conjunction
of two parity objectives defined by the functions p1 and p2 that Player A wants
to enforce, i.e. the objective of Player A is to ensure an outcome that satisfies the
two parity objectives, while the objective of Player B is to ensure an outcome
that violates at least one of the two parity objectives. W.l.o.g., we assume that
sinit ∈ SA and the turns of A and B alternate.
FromG, we construct a 3-player game arenaG′ = (S′, {S′1, S′2, S′3}, s′init, Σ′, ∆′)
(depicted in Fig. 4), with:
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s′init sinit s1 (s2, 3) s2
Bad1 Bad1,2
Modified Copy of G
σ ∈ Σ
deviate σ ∈ Σ σ ∈ Σ σ ∈ Σ
deviate
Σ′
deviate deviate
Σ′
(0, 0, 0)
(1, p1 + 1, p2 + 1)
(1, 0, 0) (1, 1, 1)
Fig. 4. Structure of the reduction from generalized parity game with a conjunction of
two parity objectives to the existence of a doomsday equilibrium with parity objectives.
– the set of states S′ = {s′init,Bad1,Bad1,2,3} ∪ SA ∪ SB ∪ (SA × {3}), this set
is partitioned as follows: S1 = SA ∪ {Bad1}, S2 = SB , S3 = (SA × {3}) ∪
{s′init,Bad1,2,3}.
– the initial state is s′init,
– the alphabet of actions is Σ′ = Σ ∪ {deviate},
– and the transitions of the game G′ are defined as follows:
• For the state s′init, for all σ ∈ Σ, ∆′(s′init, σ) = s′init, and ∆′(s′init, σ) = sinit;
i.e., the play stay in s′init, unless Player 3 plays deviate in which case the
play goes to sinit that is the copy of the initial state of the game arena
G.
• For all states s ∈ SA, for all σ ∈ Σ,∆′(s, σ) = ∆(s, σ), and∆′(s, deviate) =
Bad1, so the transition function on the copy of G behaves from states
owned by Player 1 as in the original game and it sends the game to Bad1
if Player 1 plays the action deviate.
• For all states s ∈ SB , for all σ ∈ Σ,∆′(s, σ) = (∆(s, σ), 3) and∆′(s, deviate) =
Bad1,2,3; i.e., if Player 2 plays an action from the game G, the effect is to
send the game to the Player 3 copy of the same state as in the original
game, if he deviates, the game reaches the sink state Bad1,2,3.
• For all states s ∈ SA × {3}, for all σ ∈ Σ, ∆′((s, 3), σ) = s and
∆′((s, 3), deviate) = Bad1,2,3. I.e. if Player 3 plays an action σ ∈ Σ, he
gives back the turn to Player 1, otherwise he sends the game to Bad1,2,3.
• The states Bad1 and Bad1,2,3 are absorbing.
– The parity functions (p′i)i=1,2,3 for the three players are defined to satisfy
the following condition:
• first, p′i(s′init) is even for all i = 1, 2, 3 (so if the game stays there for ever,
all the players satisfy their objectives).
• second, in Bad1 the parity functions return an even number for Player 2
and Player 3 but an odd number for Player 1, this ensures that Player 1
should never play the action deviate when the game is in the copy of G,
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• third, in Bad1,2,3 the parity functions are odd for all the Players. So
whenever Player 2 and 3 play deviate all players loose,
• finally, in the copy of G, the parity function is always odd for Player 1,
and for all states q ∈ SA ∪ SB ∪ (SA × {3}), p′2(q) = p1(s) + 1 and
p′3(q) = p2(s) + 1, where s = q if q ∈ SA ∪ SB , and s is such that
q = (s, 3) if q ∈ SA × {3}.
This concludes the reduction.
Clearly, since Player A and B always alternate their moves, in the copy of
G, any play will eventually reach a state of Player 2 and a state of Player 3, so
that they are always able to retaliate by playing the action deviate.
A doomsday equilibrium exists in G′ iff Player 1 is also able to retaliate when
the game enter the copy of G. But clearly, it is possible if and only if he has a
strategy to ensure parity(p′1) and parity(p
′
2), or equivalently iff he has a strategy
to ensure parity(p1) and parity(p2), iff Player A has a winning strategy in the
game G for the conjunction of parity objectives p1 and p2. uunionsq
s′init sinit s1
s2
Bad1
Bad1,2,3
Modified Copy of G
σ ∈ Σ
deviate
σ ∈ Σ
deviate
Σ′
deviate
Σ′
(0, 0)
(p1, p2 + 1)
(1, 1)
(1, 0)
Fig. 5. Structure of the reduction from generalized parity game with a disjunction of
two parity objectives to doomsday equilibrium with parity objectives.
Lemma 11 (NP-hardness). The problem of deciding the existence of a dooms-
day equilibrium in a 2-player game arena with parity objectives is NP-Hard.
Proof. For this part, we need to show how to reduce the problem of deciding if
Player A has a winning strategy in a two-player zero-sum game whose objective
is defined by the disjunction of two parity objectives. We only sketch the con-
struction as it is based on the main ideas used in the coNP-hardness result.
Let G = (S, sinit, Σ,∆) be a two-player game with a disjunction of two parity
objectives defined by the functions p1 and p2. The objective of Player A is to
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ensure an outcome that satisfies at least one of the two parity objectives (while
the objective of Player B is to ensure an outcome that violates both parity
objectives.)
From G, we construct a two-player game G′ with parity objectives (p′i)i=1,2
(see Fig. 5). The game arena G′ contains a copy of G plus three states s′init
(the initial state), Bad1 and Bad1,2. The alphabet of actions is Σ ∪ {deviate}.
The partition of the state space is as follows: S1 = SA and S2 = SB ∪ {s′init} ∪
{Bad1,Bad1,2}. The transitions are as follows: if Player 2 plays σ ∈ Σ in s′init
then the game stays there, if he plays deviate then the game enters the copy of
G. There the transition function for σ ∈ Σ is defined as in G, and if Player 1
plays deviate then the game goes to Bad1, and if Player 2 plays deviate then the
games goes to Bad1,2. The parity functions (p
′
i)i=1,2 are defined as follows: p
′
1
returns an even number in s′init, is equal to p1 in the copy of G, returns an odd
number in Bad1 and Bad1,2. The function p
′
2 returns an even number in s
′
init, is
equal to p2 + 1 in the copy of G (so p
′
2 is the complement of p2), returns an
even number in Bad1 and an odd number in Bad1,2. This definition of p
′
1 and p
′
2
ensures that the two players meet their parity objectives when the game always
stay in s′init and when the game enters the copy of G, Player 2 can always retaliate
while Player 1 can retaliate if and only if Player A has a winning strategy in the
original game. uunionsq
A.2 Proof of Lemma 7
s0start
s1 sinit s ∈ SGA
s′ ∈ T2
s′′ ∈ SBG
Bad
Modified Copy of G
σ∈ΣG
deviate
σ∈Σ
σ ∈ ΣG
σ ∈ ΣG
deviate
deviate
deviate
σ ∈ Σ
Fig. 6. Structure of the reduction from multi-reachability game to doomsday equi-
librium with safety objectives. Round nodes denote Player 0’s states and rectangular
nodes denote Player 1’s states.
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Proof. We reduce the two-player multi-reachability problem to our problem,
PSpace-Hardness follows. Let G = (SG, {SGA , SGB}, sGinit, ΣG, ∆G) be a two-
player (Player A and Player B) game arena. Let T = {T1, T2, . . . , Tk} be a
family of subsets of SG supposed to be pairwise disjoint (w.l.o.g.). Also wlog we
assume that Ti ⊆ SGB for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. In a multi-reachability game, the
objective of Player A is to visit each T in T , while Player B tries to avoid at
least one of the subsets in T . So, multi-reachability games are two-player zero
sum games where the winning plays for Player A are
{ρ = s0s1 . . . sn · · · ∈ Plays(G) | ∀i · 1 ≤ i ≤ k · ∃j ≥ 0 · sj ∈ Ti}.
It has been shown that the multi-reachability problem for two-player games is
PSpace-C [32, 35].
From G = (SG, {SGA , SGB}, sGinit, ΣG, ∆G) and T = {T1, T2, . . . , Tk} that define
a multi-reachability game, we construct a game arena G′ = (S, {S0, S1, . . . , Sk},
s0, Σ,∆) with k + 1 players and a set of k + 1 safety objectives Safe0, . . . ,Safek
such that Player A wins the multi-reachability objective defined by G and T iff
there exists a doomsday equilibrium inG′ for the safety objectives Safe0, . . . ,Safek.
The structure of the reduction is depicted in Fig. 6. The state space of G′ is
composed of three parts: an initial part on the left, a modified copy of G, and a
part on the right. The set S of states is {s0, s1} ∪ SGA ∪ SGB ∪ {Bad}. This set of
states is partitioned as follows: S0 = {s0} ∪ SGA ∪ {Bad}, S1 = SGB \
⋃i=k
i=2 Ti and
for all i, 2 ≤ i ≤ k, Si = Ti.
The sets of safety objectives are defined as follows: Safe0 = safe({s0, s1}), and
for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, Safei = safe(S \ ({Bad} ∪ Ti)). The alphabet of actions
is Σ = ΣG ∪ {deviate}, and the transition function is defined as follows:
– ∆(s0, σ) = s1, for all σ ∈ Σ,
– ∆(s1, σ) =
{
s0 if σ ∈ ΣG
sGinit if σ = deviate
– for all s ∈ SGA ∪ SGB :
• for all σ ∈ ΣG, ∆(s, σ) = ∆G(s, σ)
• for the letter deviate: for all states s ∈ SGA , ∆(s, deviate) = s, and for all
s ∈ SGB , ∆(s, deviate) = Bad
– Bad is a sink state.
Now, let us justify this construction. First, assume that, in the two-player game
arena G = (SG, {SG1 , SG2 }, sGinit, ΣG, ∆G) with the multi-reachability objective
given by T = {T1, T2, . . . , Tk}, Player A has a winning strategy. In that case,
we show that there exists a doomsday equilibrium in the game G′ for the safety
objectives (Safei)0≤i≤k. To establish the existence of a doomsday equilibrium,
we consider the strategy profile Λ = (λ0, λ1, . . . , λk) whose strategies respect the
following conditions:
– If all the players follows the strategy profile Λ, the outcome of the game is
(s0 · s1)ω, i.e. Player 1 avoids to play deviate in s1.
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– Whenever player 1 plays deviate in s1, then the game enters the sub game of
G′ corresponding to G, and the game thus enters an unsafe state for Player 0
(as sinit is not part of Safe0). From there, Player 0 must retaliate by forcing
a visit to each set in T = {T1, T2, . . . , Tk} to make sure that all the other
players lose. By hypothesis, in G, Player A has a winning strategy for the
multi-reachability objective, so we know that if the other players play letters
that are in ΣG then all sets in T will eventually be visited when Player 0
plays according to the winning strategy of Player A in G. On the other hand,
if the letter deviate is played then the game goes to the state Bad where all
the safety objectives are violated. So, we have established that Player 0 can
retaliate if he plays as Player A in the copy of G. Now, let us consider all the
other players. According to the definition of the transition function, Player i
has the option to retaliate whenever he enters its unsafe set Ti by choosing
the action deviate and so force a visit to Bad. So, all other players have also
the ability to retaliate whenever they enter their unsafe region.
So, we have established that (λ0, λ1, . . . , λk) witnesses a doomsday equilibrium
in G′.
Now, let us consider the other direction. Let (λ0, λ1, . . . , λk) be a profile of
strategies which witnesses a doomsday equilibrium for G′ and the safety objec-
tives given by the subsets of plays (Safei)i=0,..,k. In that case, if we consider a
prefix of play that enters for the first time the state sinit, we know by definition
of doomsday equilibrium that Player 0 has a strategy to retaliate against any
strategies of the adversaries. If all the other players chooses their letters in ΣG
then it should be the case that the play visits all the sets in T . So, this clearly
means that Player A has a winning strategy in G for the multi-reachability ob-
jective defined by T , this strategy simply follows the strategy λ0 in the copy of
G. uunionsq
B Complexity of Doomsday Equilibria for Imperfect
Information Games
We now present automata construction to recognize sequences of observations
that are doomsday compatible and prefixes that are good for retaliation.
Lemma 12. Given an n-player game G with imperfect information and a set
of reachability, safety or parity objectives (ϕi)1≤i≤n, we can construct for each
Player i, in exponential time, a deterministic Streett automaton Di whose lan-
guage is exactly the set of sequences of observations η ∈ (Oi × (Σ ∪ {τ}))ω that
are doomsday compatible for Player i, i.e.
L(Di) = {η ∈ (Oi × (Σ ∪ {τ}))ω | ∀ρ ∈ γi(η) · ρ ∈ ϕi ∪
⋂
j 6=i
ϕj}.
For each Di, the size of its set of states is bounded by O(2
nk log k) and the number
of Streett pairs is bounded by O(nk2) where k is the number of states in G.
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Proof. Let G = (S, (Si)1≤i≤n, sinit, Σ,∆, (Oi)1≤i≤n), and let us show the con-
structions for Player i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We treat the three types of winning conditions
as follows.
We start with safety objectives. Assume that the safety objectives are defined
implicitly by the following tuple of sets of safe states: (T1, T2, . . . , Tn), i.e. ϕi =
safe(Ti). First, we construct the automaton
A = (QA, qAinit, (Oi × (Σ ∪ {τ}), δA)
over the alphabet Oi × (Σ ∪ {τ}) as follows:
– QA = S, i.e. the states of A are the states of the game structure G,
– qAinit = sinit,
– (q, (o, σ), q′) ∈ δA if q ∈ o and there exists σ′ ∈ Σ such that ∆(q, σ′) = q′
and such that σ = τ if q 6∈ Si, and σ = σ′ if q ∈ Si.
The acceptance condition of A is universal and expressed with LTL syntax:
A word w is accepted by A iff all runs ρ of A on w satisfy ρ |= Ti ∨
∧
j 6=i ♦Tj .
Clearly, the language defined by A is exactly the set of sequences of observations
η ∈ (Oi× (Σ ∪{τ}))ω that are doomsday compatible for Player i, this is because
the automaton A checks (using universal nondeterminism) that all plays that
are compatible with a sequence of observations are doomsday compatible.
Let us show that we can construct a deterministic Streett automaton Di that
accepts the language of A and whose size is such that: (i) its number of states is
at most O(2(nk log k)) and (ii) its number of Streett pairs is at most O(nk). We
obtain D with the following series of constructions:
– First, note that we can equivalently see A as the intersection of the languages
of n − 1 universal automata Aj with the acceptance condition Ti ∨ ♦Tj ,
j 6= i, 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
– Each Aj can be modified so that a violation of Ti is made permanent and
a visit to Tj is recorded. For this, we use a state space which is equal to
QA × {0, 1} × {0, 1}, the first bit records a visit to Ti and the second a visit
to Tj . We denote this automaton by A
′
j , and its acceptance condition is now
♦(QA×{0, 1}×{0})→ ♦(QA×{0}×{0, 1}). Clearly, this is a universal
Streett automaton with a single Streett pair.
– A′j , which is a universal Streett automaton, can be complemented (by du-
ality) by interpreting it as a nondeterministic Rabin automaton (with one
Rabin pair). This nondeterministic Rabin automaton can be made deter-
ministic using a Safra like procedure, and according to [33] we obtain a de-
terministic Rabin automaton with O(2k log k) states and O(k) Rabin pairs.
Let us call this automaton A′′j .
– Now, A′′j can be complemented by considering its Rabin pairs as Streett
pairs (by dualization of the acceptance condition): we obtain a deterministic
Streett automaton with O(k) Streett pairs for each Aj .
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– Now, we need to take the intersection of the n−1 deterministic automata A′′j
(interpreted as Streett automata). Using a classical synchronized product we
obtain a single deterministic Streett automaton Di of size with O(2
nk log k)
states and O(nk) Streett pairs. This finishes our proof for safety objectives.
Let us now consider reachability objectives. Therefore we now assume the
states in T1, . . . , Tn to be target states for each player respectively, i.e. ϕi =
reach(Ti). The construction is in the same spirit as the construction for safety.
Let A = (QA, qAinit, Oi × (Σ ∪ {τ}), δA) be the automaton over (Oi × (Σ ∪ {τ})
constructed from G as for safety, with the following (universal) acceptance con-
dition;
A word w is accepted by A iff all runs ρ of A on w satisfy ρ |= (∨j 6=i ♦Tj)→♦Ti.
Clearly, the language defined by A is exactly the set of sequences of observa-
tions η ∈ ((Σ ∪ {τ}) × Oi)ω that are doomsday compatible for Player i (w.r.t.
the reachability objectives). Let us show that we can construct a deterministic
Streett automaton Di that accepts the language of A and whose size is such that:
(i) its number of states is at most O(2(nk log k)) and (ii) its number of Streett
pairs is at most O(nk). We obtain Di with the following series of constructions:
– First, the acceptance condition can be rewritten as
∧
j 6=i(♦Tj → ♦Ti). Then
clearly if Aj is a copy of A with acceptance condition ♦Tj → ♦Ti then
L(A) =
⋂
j 6=i L(Aj).
– For each Aj , we construct a universal Streett automaton with one Streett
pair by memorizing the visits to Ti and Tj and considering the acceptance
condition ♦Tj → ♦Ti. So, we get a universal automaton with a single
Streett pair.
– Then we follow exactly the last three steps (3 to 5) of the construction for
safety.
Finally, let us consider parity objectives. The construction is similar to the
other cases. Specifically, we can take as acceptance condition for A the universal
condition
∧
j 6=i(parityi ∨ parityj), and treat each condition parityi ∨ parityj sepa-
rately. We dualize the acceptance condition of A, into the nondeterministic con-
dition parityi ∧ parityj . This acceptance condition can be equivalently expressed
as a Streett condition with at most O(k) Streett pairs. This automaton accepts
exactly the set of observation sequences that are not doomsday compatible for
Player i against Player j. Now, using optimal procedure for determinization, we
can obtain a deterministic Rabin automaton, with O(k2) pairs that accepts the
same language [37]. Now, by interpreting the pairs of the acceptance condition as
Streett pairs instead of Rabin pairs, we obtain a deterministic Streett automaton
Aj that accepts the set of observations sequences that are doomsday compatible
for Player i against Player j. Now, it suffices to take the product of the n − 1
deterministic Streett automata Aj to obtain the desired automaton A, its size
is at most O(2nk log k) with at most O(nk2) Streett pairs. uunionsq
Lemma 13. Given an n-player game arena G with imperfect information and
a set of reachability, safety or parity objectives (ϕi)1≤i≤n, for each Player i,
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we can construct a finite-state automaton Ci that accepts exactly the prefixes of
observation sequences that are good for retaliation for Player i.
Proof. Let us show how to construct this finite-state automaton for any Player i,
1 ≤ i ≤ n. Our construction follows these steps:
– First, we construct from G, according to lemma 12, a deterministic Streett
automaton Di = (Q
Di , qDiinit, (Oi × (Σ ∪ {τ}), δDi ,StDi) that accepts exactly
the set of sequences of observations η ∈ (Oi × (Σ ∪ {τ}))ω that are dooms-
day compatible for Player i. We know that the number of states in Di is
O(2|S|
2 log |S|) and the number of Streett pairs is bounded by O(|S|2 · n),
where |S| is the number of states in G.
– Second, we consider a turn-based game played on Di by two players, A and
B, that move a token from states to states along edges of Di as follows:
1. initially, the token is in some state q
2. then in each round: B chooses an observation o ∈ Oi in the set {o ∈
Oi | ∃(q, (o, σ), q′) ∈ δDi}. Then A chooses a transition (q, (o, σ), q′) ∈ δDi
(which is completely determined by σ as Di is deterministic), and the
token is moved to q′ where a new round starts.
The objective of A is to enforce from state q an infinite sequence of states, so
a run of Di that starts in q, and which satisfies St
Di the Streett condition of
Di. For each q, this can be decided in time polynomial in the number of states
in Di and exponential in the number of Streett pairs in St
Di , see [38] for an
algorithm with the best known complexity. Thus, the overall complexity is
exponential in the size of the game structure G. We denote by Win ⊆ QDi
the set of states q from which A can win the game above.
– Note that if (o1, σ1) . . . (om, σm) is the trace of a path from qinit in Di to a
state q ∈Win, then clearly (o1, σ1) . . . (on−1, σn−1)on is good for retaliation.
Indeed, the winning strategy of A in q is an observation based retaliating
strategy λRi for Player i in G. On the other hand, if a prefix of observations
reaches q 6∈Win then by determinacy of Streett games, we know that B has a
winning strategy in q and this winning strategy is a strategy for the coalition
(against Player i) in G to enforce a play in which Player i does not win and at
least one of the other players wins. So, from Di and Win, we can construct a
finite state automaton Ci which is obtained as a copy of Di with the following
acceptance condition: a prefix κ = (o0, σ0), (o1, σ1), . . . , (ok−1, σk−1), ok is
accepted by Ci if there exists a path q0q1 . . . qk in Ci such that q0 is the
initial state of Ci and either there exists a transition labeled (ok, σ) from qk
to a state of Win. uunionsq
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